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INTRODUCTION
Does the administration of a public school system have the power to punish a
student for engaging in “Internet bullying” outside the walls of a school? The Fourth
Circuit answered this question in the affirmative with its recent opinion in Kowalski v.
Berkeley County Schools.1 With the emergence of social media, the free speech rights
of students and school systems’ ability to punish students for engaging in speech
over the Internet have become increasingly prevalent issues.2 As the instances of
what has been coined “cyberbullying” are increasing, so are the detrimental effects
that this behavior has on the student population.3
Despite the increasing number of “Internet bullying,” or “cyberbullying” cases,
federal courts have differed in their views on the issue, and to date, the United States
Supreme Court has yet to weigh in.4 These differences have been brought to light
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1 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011).
2 See Kathleen Fitzgerald, Bills to Curb Cyber-Bullying Raise Free-Speech Concerns,
STUDENT PRESS LAW CENTER (Feb. 4, 2008), http://www.splc.org/news/newsflash.asp?id=1679
(explaining a variety of legislative proposals to combat cyberbullying).
3 See Kathleen Conn, Allegations of School District Liability for Bullying, Cyberbullying,
and Teen Suicides After Sexting: Are New Legal Standards Emerging in the Courts?, 37 NEW
ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 227, 229 (2011) (explaining that given the statistics
that show face-to-face bullying is increasing in the public school system, “the statistics and
consequences for cyberbullying are even more profound” (citing John Shryock, Cyber Bullying
Pushes Many Teens Over the Edge, WSFA 12 NEWS (Nov. 16, 2010), http://www.wsfa.com
/Global/story.asp?S=13515176)). In fact, “[a]nywhere from 15–33% of students ages thirteen
to eighteen years of age report being cyberbullied on a consistent basis.” Id. at 231 (citing
Cyberbullying, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., http://www.stopbullying.gov/topics
/cyberbullying/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2012)).
4 See Jill J. Myers & Gayle T. Carper, Cyber Bullying: The Legal Challenge for Educators,
238 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 15 (2008) (“The bottom line is that legal guidance is scarce. The Supreme
Court has not yet considered a case of students’ use of electronic text . . . .”).
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after several other high profile opinions in the federal circuits were issued over the
summer of 2011.5 In Kowalski, the Fourth Circuit decided to use the “substantial
disruption” test established by Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District.6 The Third Circuit previously relied on the “vulgar and offensive” exception
to student speech, which was established as another exception to students’ rights to
free speech in Bethel School District v. Fraser.7 This test, however, has its limita-
tions, as it has been interpreted to apply only when students engage in speech on
school premises.8 Only very recently did the Third Circuit reconsider the issue of
whether schools can regulate targeted and offensive off-campus speech when it re-
heard J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District9 during the summer of
2011. In its final Snyder decision, the Third Circuit brought itself in line with the
Second and Fourth Circuits by holding that Tinker does in fact apply in situations
involving the off-campus cyberspeech of a student.10 Despite its agreement with the
applicable test in these circumstances, the Third Circuit’s most recent Snyder opinion
created a circuit split with the Second and Fourth Circuits, because the Third Circuit
has interpreted Tinker’s “substantial disruption” test to mean something else in its
application.11 In Tinker, the Supreme Court held that school administrators may
regulate speech “which might reasonably [lead] school authorities to forecast sub-
stantial disruption of or material interference with school activities.”12 The Third
5 See, e.g., J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011),
cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012); Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 593
F.3d 249 (3d Cir. 2010); T.V. ex rel. B.V. v. Smith-Green Cmty. Sch. Corp., 807 F. Supp.
2d 767 (N.D. Ind. 2011); J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp.
2d 1094 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
6 393 U.S. 503 (1969). The test in Tinker allows a school system to discipline a student
for speech or expression that substantially disrupts the operation of the school or invades the
rights of other students. Id. at 513 (“[C]onduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for
any reason—whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior—materially disrupts class-
work or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not
immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.”).
7 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986) (“[I]t is a highly appropriate function of public school edu-
cation to prohibit . . . vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse.”).
8 See Snyder, 650 F.3d at 932 (explaining that the school system had no authority to
punish a student for internet speech that originated from his home because “Fraser does not
apply to off-campus speech”); Layshock, 593 F.3d at 260.
9 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012).
10 Id. at 926. See also Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 567 (4th Cir. 2011);
Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 50 (2d Cir. 2008); Wisniewski v. Board of Educ., 494
F.3d 34, 38–39 (2d Cir. 2007).
11 See Snyder, 650 F.3d at 950 (Fisher, J., dissenting) (“Our decision today causes a split
with the Second Circuit. In applying Tinker, the Second Circuit has held that off-campus
hostile and offensive student internet speech that is directed at school officials results in a
substantial disruption of the classroom environment.”).
12 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969). The Author
will refer to this as the “reasonably foreseeable” component of Tinker.
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Circuit’s view of the “substantial disruption” test severely limits the scope of the
“reasonably foreseeable” component of the test, which in turn limits a school
district’s power to regulate off-campus speech.13 Other federal district courts have
also followed the Third Circuit’s approach,14 limiting school administrators’ power
to regulate off-campus speech as a result.
Other courts, much like the Fourth Circuit in Kowalski, have “concluded that
school administrators’ authority to regulate student speech extends, in the appropriate
circumstances, to speech that does not originate at the school itself, as long as the
speech eventually makes its way to the school in a meaningful way.”15 What we are
left with are two interpretations of a legal standard that governs off-campus Internet
speech that are in conflict with each other. Furthermore, courts that deal with this
issue as a matter of first impression are left with little guidance. Because cyber-
bullying is a relatively new phenomenon, cases that implicate off-campus speech
“present a real conundrum for courts trying to balance students’ First Amendment
rights against the need to maintain order in schools.”16 Should the Supreme Court
weigh in on this issue, it should favor Kowalski’s interpretation of the “substantial
disruption” test for the reasons articulated below.
A number of commentators argue that decisions analogous to Kowalski essen-
tially destroy students’ right to engage in protected speech.17 This Note argues that
despite the alternative standards that federal courts have applied to determine the
constitutionality of regulating the off-campus speech of students, the “substantial
disruption” test, as applied in Kowalski (and similar cases), makes the most sense.
The test achieves the policy goal of preventing bullying by allowing administrators
to regulate speech outside of the school that will eventually cause harm inside of the
school.18 More importantly, Kowalski’s application of the substantial disruption test
13 See infra Part III.B.
14 See, e.g., J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094
(C.D. Cal. 2010).
15 School Disciplines Student for Cruel Webpage, 29 NO. 9 MCQUILLIN MUN. L. REP. 4,
Sept. 2011; see also Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 50 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[O]ff-campus
conduct of this sort ‘can create a foreseeable risk of substantial disruption within a school’
and that, in such circumstances, its off-campus character does not necessarily insulate the
student from school discipline.” (quoting Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 39)).
16 Associated Press, 4th Circuit Backs W.Va. School in Dispute Over Student’s Web Page,
FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER (July 28, 2011), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/4th-circuit
-backs-w-va-school-in-dispute-over-student’s-web-page (internal quotation marks omitted).
17 See, e.g., Ari Cohn, Fourth Circuit Expands Schools’ Abilities to Punish Off-Campus
Speech, FOUNDATION FOR INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN EDUCATION (July 29, 2011), http://thefire.org
/article/13429.html (“[T]his opinion strikes a serious blow against the rights of high school
students, and drives the wedge between the Circuit Courts of Appeal on student speech even
further, raising the stakes for an eventual Supreme Court showdown.”).
18 See Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584, 596 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[S]chool officials have
an affirmative duty to not only ameliorate the harmful effects of disruptions, but to prevent
them from happening in the first place.”).
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limits liability that schools may face in the wake of cyberbullying incidents because
it allows administrators to regulate speech up to the point where courts have previ-
ously allowed liability in these types of bullying or harassment cases.19 Currently,
schools have little legal guidance on what constitutes a “substantial disruption.”20
When the jurisprudence is unclear, schools face a catch-22: either regulate off-campus
speech and risk a First Amendment suit by a cyberbully, or do nothing and risk a suit
by the target of the off-campus speech.21 This Note argues that in the important realm
of financial liability for public schools, Kowalski’s version of the substantial dis-
ruption test saves money by confronting hurtful, online speech directed at school offi-
cials or students head on. The Kowalski court, in its analysis of the facts, adopted a
more forgiving definition of what constitutes “reasonable foreseeability,” allowing
school administrators greater latitude in punishing students for off-campus online
bullying.22 In contrast, the Third Circuit’s take on the “reasonable foreseeability” prong
of the “substantial disruption” test is limited by its analysis of the facts in Snyder.23
The consequence is that in the Third Circuit, and other jurisdictions that follow its
interpretation of the “substantial disruption” test, administrators are more limited in
what types of speech they can regulate as being a foreseeable disruption to the school
environment. The Third Circuit’s interpretation might even preclude action when ad-
ministrators have knowledge of off-campus, online bullying, and in turn, can open
up school systems to liability for failing to act to protect their student victims.
In order to understand why the Fourth Circuit’s interpretation in Kowalski of the
“substantial disruption” test is preferable to any other, we must also explore the history
of students’ First Amendment rights, school liability, and the cyberbullying phenom-
enon. Part I of this Note will define cyberbullying, and explain why it is a problem
due to the diffuse nature of the cyberbully’s expression. Part II of this Note will present
the necessary background jurisprudence involving students’ First Amendment rights.
Next, Part III of this Note will detail the Fourth Circuit’s holding in Kowalski, the
key difference between Kowalski’s interpretation of the substantial disruption test
and the interpretations of other courts, including the Third Circuit, and explain critics’
fears regarding the broadening of educators’ authority to regulate off-campus speech
as a result of Kowalski. Part IV of this Note will outline the increasing instances of
school liability arising from failures to address the harms of off-campus speech, and
argue that there is a gap between what kind of speech administrators can regulate
and that for which they can be held liable in the courts. Finally, Part V of this Note
19 See, e.g., Abby Mollen, In Defense of the “Hazardous Freedom” of Controversial
Student Speech, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1501, 1527 (2008).
20 Compare Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011), with J.S. ex
rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.
Ct. 1097 (2012).
21 See infra Part IV.B.
22 See Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 574.
23 See Snyder, 650 F.3d at 920.
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will argue that despite any fears of over-regulation, the substantial disruption test as
interpreted in Kowalski best enables administrators to promote the goals of public edu-
cation, and, more importantly, closes the gap between administrators’ liability and
authority to control speech, thereby limiting the financial liability of public schools.
I. CYBERBULLYING AND ITS EFFECTS
Cyberbullying is defined as the “willful and repeated harm inflicted through the
medium of electronic text.”24 Commonly, students use “Internet web sites, chat
rooms, instant messaging, text and picture messaging on phones, and blogs, to bully
peers.”25 While most incidents of cyberbullying occur off campus, “many of these
incidents follow a natural progression into the hallways of the local schools.”26 In the
case of cyberbullying, technology actually aids a bully, because it limits the chance
of discovery and punishment, and the bully might not realize the full extent of the
harm caused to the victim.27
Cyberbullying is particularly dangerous due to its broad consequences. A cyber-
bully’s threat or communication can be “widely distributed at the click of a mouse,”
resulting in access to a potentially endless audience that can exacerbate the negative
consequences of the bullying.28 In addition to exposure to a wider audience that may
cause a victim to experience further harassment and ridicule, cyberbullying’s elec-
tronic medium ensures that the effects linger longer than traditional, spoken words.29
For example, “hurtful comments may remain online indefinitely, forcing victims to
relive the pain every time they turn on the computer or visit a particular website.”30
Instances of cyberbullying are also becoming more widespread,31 resulting in
increasingly serious consequences for victims, such as absence from school, wors-
ening academic grades, dropping out, or switching schools to avoid further harm.32
In the most extreme cases of cyberbullying, repeat occurrences and the school’s
24 Myers & Carper, supra note 4, at 3 (quoting J.W. Patchin & S. Hinduja, Bullies Move
Beyond the Schoolyard: A Preliminary Look at Cyberbullying, 4 YOUTH VIOLENCE & JUV.
JUST. 148 (2006)).
25 Todd D. Erb, Note, A Case for Strengthening School District Jurisdiction to Punish
Off-Campus Incidents of Cyberbullying, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 257, 257 (2008).
26 Id. at 258.
27 Myers & Carper, supra note 4, at 3 (“Anonymity not only shields the bully from
discovery, it conceals the impact of the conduct from the offender’s view. Offenders are not
directly and immediately aware of how their conduct impacts others.”).
28 Alison V. King, Note, Constitutionality of Cyberbullying Laws: Keeping the Online
Playground Safe for Both Teens and Free Speech, 63 VAND. L. REV. 845, 850 (2010).
29 See id. at 850–51.
30 Id.
31 See id. at 849 (explaining that between the years 2000 and 2005, online harassment of
youth increased a reported fifty percent).
32 See Myers & Carper, supra note 4, at 4–5.
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failure to adequately address the situation have lead to depression, and, ultimately,
student suicide.33
II. FREE SPEECH PROTECTION UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Citizens generally have the right to freedom of expression, guaranteed by the
Constitution.34 The First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech.”35 It is a “bedrock principle underlying the First
Amendment . . . that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea
simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”36 There are,
however, exceptions to this broad right to freedom of speech and expression, one of
which applies to students. As the Fourth Circuit held in Kowalski, “[w]hile students
retain significant First Amendment rights in the school context, their rights are not
coextensive with those of adults.”37 “Because of the ‘special characteristics of the
school environment,’ school administrators have some latitude in regulating student
speech to further educational objectives.”38
This latitude that school administrators enjoy manifests itself in four oft-cited
instances.39 First, as established in Tinker, “a school may censor student speech that
causes a material and substantial disruption in the school environment or infringes
on the rights of others.”40 It is important to note that the speech in Tinker occurred
on campus and during school hours.41 In recent years, however, courts have been
open to expand the Tinker standard to include off-campus Internet speech, which is
essentially what the Fourth Circuit did in Kowalski.42
33 See King, supra note 28, at 851 (detailing the stories of several high profile instances
of cyberbullying, including the cases of Megan Meier and Ryan Halligan, in which cyber-
bullying acted as a “catalyst to suicide”).
34 See U.S. CONST. amend I.
35 Id.
36 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).
37 Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 571 (4th Cir. 2011) (citing Tinker v.
Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).
38 Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 505).
39 Harriet A. Hoder, Note, Supervising Cyberspace: A Simple Threshold for Public School
Jurisdiction Over Students’ Online Activity, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1563, 1570 (2009) (“Four sem-
inal decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court determine when school officials may discipline a
public school student for his or her expression. These cases provide less First Amendment
protection for students in public schools and establish that certain kinds of student speech are
never permissible in school.” (citations omitted)).
40 Id. at 1571 (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512–13).
41 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512–13 (“When [a student] is . . . on the campus during the autho-
rized hours, he may express his opinions, even on controversial subjects . . . if he does so
without ‘materially and substantially interfer[ing] with the requirements of appropriate disci-
pline in the operation of the school’ and without colliding with the rights of others.” (quoting
Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966))).
42 See Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011); Wisniewski v.
Board of Educ., 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that internet speech made by students
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The Supreme Court has also held that school administrators may prohibit stu-
dents from engaging in “lewd, indecent, or offensive speech and conduct.”43 In Bethel
School District v. Fraser,44 the school administration punished a student for using
a sexually explicit statement to promote his friend’s candidacy for a student govern-
ment position at a school-wide assembly.45 The Court held that the student’s speech
was lewd, indecent, or otherwise offensive, especially given that he was speaking
directly to a captive audience.46 Accordingly, the school did not violate the student’s
First Amendment rights by punishing him pursuant to established school rules.47 The
Court relied heavily on the notion that schools stand in loco parentis to the students
to justify its decision to limit First Amendment rights within the walls of the public
school system, emphasizing an already established goal of protecting minors from
obscenity and vulgarity.48
A third exception to First Amendment protection for students was established
in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.49 The Supreme Court held that if the
speech in question occurs in a source such as a school newspaper, or at an event that
is sponsored by a school, it can be regulated as long as the regulation is “reasonably
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”50 The rule expressed in Kuhlmeier re-
quires that the speech be in a school-sponsored forum, thus, this standard has not yet
is governed by the “substantial disruption” test established by Tinker and that students can
be punished for out-of-school speech that violates school rules).
43 Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986).
44 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
45 Id. at 677–78.
46 Id. at 679–80, 685.
47 Id. at 685 (“The First Amendment does not prevent the school officials from deter-
mining that to permit a vulgar and lewd speech such as respondent’s would undermine the
school’s basic educational mission.”).
48 Id. at 684 (recognizing “the obvious concern on the part of parents, and school autho-
rities acting in loco parentis, to protect children—especially in a captive audience—from
exposure to sexually explicit, indecent, or lewd speech”). The Supreme Court as expressed
similar concerns for protecting minors in other areas of society as well. See Board of Educ.
v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (holding that school administrations have power to remove
books from the school curriculum if they are deemed vulgar); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438
U.S. 726 (1978) (recognizing an interest in protecting minors from vulgar or lewd radio
content); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (upholding a state law banning the sale
of sexually explicit material to minors, even though the material was subject to First Amend-
ment protections when sold to adults).
49 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
50 Id. at 273 (“[W]e hold that educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising
editorial control over the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive
activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”).
The Court also echoed the same paternalistic concerns as it did in Fraser. Id. (“This stan-
dard is consistent with our oft-expressed view that the education of the Nation’s youth is pri-
marily the responsibility of parents, teachers, and state and local school officials, and not of
federal judges.”).
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been used to regulate Internet speech by students that occurs off campus.51 There is
a possibility, however, that Kuhlmeier can play a larger role in subsequent cases
involving off-campus Internet speech, given the increase in school-sponsored laptop
programs in recent years.52
A fourth and recent exception to students’ First Amendment rights was estab-
lished in 2007 by the Supreme Court’s decision in Morse v. Frederick.53 The expres-
sion in question in Morse was a banner that a student at Juneau-Douglas High School
(JDHS) unveiled at an off-campus, school-sanctioned event that stated, “BONG HiTS
4 JESUS.”54 The Supreme Court reasoned that “[t]he ‘special characteristics of the
school environment’ and the governmental interest in stopping student drug abuse—
reflected in the policies of Congress and myriad school boards, including JDHS—
allow schools to restrict student expression that they reasonably regard as promoting
illegal drug use.”55 Again, the Court also emphasized the notion that schools stand
in loco parentis to students to further justify the holding:
School principals have a difficult job, and a vitally important one.
When Frederick suddenly and unexpectedly unfurled his banner,
Morse had to decide to act—or not act—on the spot. It was rea-
sonable for her to conclude that the banner promoted illegal drug
use—in violation of established school policy—and that failing
to act would send a powerful message to the students in her charge,
including Frederick, about how serious the school was about the
dangers of illegal drug use. The First Amendment does not re-
quire schools to tolerate at school events student expression that
contributes to those dangers.56
The speech in question in Morse occurred outside the walls of the school.57 The
facts of the case, however, led the Court to believe that this was not important, since
51 See Jacob Tabor, Note, Students’ First Amendment Rights in the Age of the Internet:
Off-Campus Cyberspeech and School Regulation, 50 B.C. L. REV. 561, 579–80 (2009) (“The
essence of the Supreme Court’s 1988 decision in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier
is that a school must have great leeway to reasonably regulate speech that might be attributed
to it. . . . Kuhlmeier thus cannot apply to off-campus speech unless it might be interpreted
as being part of the school’s speech. A website claiming to be the school’s website might fall
in this category, but very little else would.” (citations omitted)).
52 Stephanie Steinberg, More Students Need a Laptop Computer for the Classroom,
USA TODAY (Aug. 23, 2010), http://www.usatoday.com/news/education/2010-08-24-class
roomlaptops24_ST_N.htm (explaining that since 1996, Microsoft’s non-profit laptop pro-
gram with public schools has grown from 29 to over 10,000 participant schools).
53 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
54 Id. at 397.
55 Id. at 408 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
506 (1969)).
56 Id. at 409–10.
57 Id. at 397.
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there was a sufficient connection between the speech, the event, and the relationship
to the school.58 In fact, the Court believed the situation was analogous to actually
being in school.59 The Court noted that “[t]he event occurred during normal school
hours . . . as an approved social event or class trip,” and that the school district had an
express policy that students present on an “approved social event[ ] [or] class trip[]
are subject to district rules for student conduct.”60 Furthermore, teachers and admin-
istrators accompanied the students on the trip in a supervisory capacity.61 In these
circumstances, the Court believed that Frederick’s planned and targeted speech was
engaged in such a manner as to constitute in-school speech. The Court stated:
Frederick, standing among other JDHS students across the street
from the school, directed his banner toward the school, making
it plainly visible to most students. Under these circumstances,
we agree with the superintendent that Frederick cannot stand in
the midst of his fellow students, during school hours, at a school-
sanctioned activity and claim he is not at school.62
Despite this analysis, the Court did express worry at the fact that it is uncertain as to
where the boundaries lie when courts are applying free speech exceptions to public
school students.63
III. KOWALSKI AND THE “SUBSTANTIAL DISRUPTION” TEST
A. Overview of Kowalski
Kowalski is the most recent in a line of cases that deals with a school administra-
tion’s authority to punish a student for or otherwise prohibit a student from engaging
in off-campus speech that would violate school policy.64 In 2005, Kara Kowalski,
then a senior in high school, created a discussion group web page on MySpace.com
from her home computer.65 The web page was targeted at a fellow classmate, Shay N.,
and contained mean-spirited content regarding Shay’s personal life, suggesting that
Shay was a “slut” and had “herpes.”66 After Kowalski invited approximately 100 fellow
58 Id. at 400–01.
59 Id.
60 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
61 Id. at 401.
62 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
63 See id. (“There is some uncertainty at the outer boundaries as to when courts should
apply school speech precedents . . . .”).
64 See, e.g., Wisniewski v. Board of Educ., 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007); Mardis v. Hannibal
Pub. Sch. Dist., 684 F. Supp. 2d 1114 (E.D. Mo. 2010); O.Z. v. Board of Trs. of Long Beach
Unified Sch. Dist., No. CV 08-5671, 2008 WL 4396895 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2008).
65 Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 567 (4th Cir. 2011).
66 Id. (“Under the webpage’s title, she posted the statement, ‘No No Herpes, We don’t
want no herpes.’ Kowalski claimed in her deposition that ‘S.A.S.H.’ was an acronym for
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classmates to join the web page, Shay N. became aware of its existence and notified her
parents, who accompanied her to school the next day in order to file a harassment com-
plaint with the administration.67 The purpose of the web page was obviously to ridi-
cule Shay, and it succeeded in that purpose.68 “[S]he did not want to attend classes that
day, feeling uncomfortable about sitting in class with students who had posted com-
ments about her on the MySpace webpage.”69
In response to the complaint filed by Shay’s parents, school administrators met
to discuss possible punishment.70 The administrators determined that “Kowalski had
created a ‘hate website,’ in violation of the school policy against ‘harassment, bully-
ing, and intimidation.’”71 Punishment, therefore, was both necessary and warranted.
The administration:
suspended Kowalski from school for 10 days and issued her a
90-day “social suspension,” which prevented her from attending
school events in which she was not a direct participant. Kowalski
was also prevented from crowning the next “Queen of Charm”
in that year’s Charm Review, having been elected “Queen” her-
self the previous year. In addition, she was not allowed to partic-
ipate on the cheerleading squad for the remainder of the year.72
As a result of this punishment, Kowalski claimed that “she became socially
isolated from her peers,” “received cold treatment from teachers,” and “became
depressed” to the point that she required medication.73 She eventually filed a lawsuit
against the school system, alleging that the administration’s decision to punish her
for the MySpace web page constituted a violation of the First Amendment.74
In terms of the First Amendment claim, the issue before the court was whether
the school system violated Kowalski’s First Amendment rights when it punished her
‘Students Against Sluts Herpes,’ but a classmate, Ray Parsons, stated that it was an acronym
for ‘Students Against Shay’s Herpes,’ referring to another Musselman High School Student,
Shay N., who was the main subject of discussion on the webpage.”).
67 Id. at 568.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 568–69.
72 Id. at 569.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 570. Kowalski also alleged several other federal and state law claims, which are
not relevant to this discussion. Id. (explaining that Kowalski also alleged due process vio-
lations under the Fifth Amendment, cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
Amendment, equal protection violations under the Fourteenth Amendment, violations of
corresponding provisions of the West Virginia Constitution, and a state law claim for inten-
tional or negligent infliction of emotional distress).
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for speech that occurred off campus. Kowalski attempted to make the geographical
distinction between on- and off-campus speech, arguing “that since this case involves
off campus speech (she created the My Space page off-campus) and it was not school
related, the First Amendment shielded her from school discipline.”75 “The School
District argued that they can, consistent with the First Amendment[,] regulate off-
campus behavior as long as the behavior creates a foreseeable risk of reaching the
school and causing a substantial disruption to the work and discipline of the school.”76
The Fourth Circuit agreed with the school system, holding that under precedent estab-
lished in Tinker, “a student may be disciplined for expressive conduct, even conduct
occurring off school grounds, when this conduct would foreseeably create a risk of
substantial disruption within the school environment, at least when it was similarly
foreseeable that the off-campus expression might also reach campus.”77
The Fourth Circuit had no serious reservation in using the “substantial disrup-
tion” test established in Tinker to justify its holding that the administration’s pun-
ishment of Kowalski did not violate the First Amendment.78 Some commentators
are wary of this justification, however, because it is hard to determine the foresee-
ability of off-campus speech reaching campus.79 In fact, the Fourth Circuit acknowl-
edged that a line must be drawn somewhere regarding the foreseeability component
of the Tinker standard, but declined to undertake the task of determining where
that line is.80
75 Brian S. Batterton, Social Network Bullying & Constitutional Issues Regarding School
Discipline, LEGAL & LIABILITY RISK MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE (Aug. 2011), http://www.llrmi
.com/articles/legal_update/2011_social_bully1.shtml.
76 Id.
77 Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 574 (quoting Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 48 (2d Cir.
2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The court reasoned that the facts surrounding
Kowalski’s conduct satisfied this standard. Id. (“[E]ven though Kowalski was not physically
at the school when she operated her computer to create the webpage . . . other circuits have
applied Tinker to such circumstances. To be sure, it was foreseeable in this case that Kowalski’s
conduct would reach the school via computers, smartphones, and other electronic devices,
given that most of the ‘S.A.S.H.’ group’s members and the target of the group’s harassment
were Musselman High School students. Indeed, the ‘S.A.S.H.’ webpage did make its way
into the school and was accessed first by Musselman student Ray Parsons at 3:40 p.m., from
a school computer during an after hours class. Furthermore, as we have noted, it created a
reasonably foreseeable substantial disruption there.”).
78 Id. at 574.
79 See Hoder, supra note 39, at 1582.
80 Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 573 (“There is surely a limit to the scope of a high school’s in-
terest in the order, safety, and well-being of its students when the speech at issue originates
outside the schoolhouse gate. But we need not fully define that limit here, as we are satisfied
that the nexus of Kowalski’s speech . . . was sufficiently strong to justify the action taken by
school officials . . . .”). See also Wisniewski v. Board of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 39 n.4 (2d Cir.
2007) (explaining that the panel was split on what the proper test for foreseeability should
be in the context of the “substantial disruption” test).
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B. Kowalski and “Substantial Disruption” Compared to Other Attempts to
Regulate Off-Campus Expression
One of the more recent cases that has added to the confusion regarding schools
and cyberspeech jurisprudence is J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain School
District.81 After many appeals, reversals and rehearings, the Third Circuit applied
the Tinker standard to a fact pattern that was similar to that in Kowalski, but ended up
with an entirely different result.82 The case involved an eighth grade student, J.S., who
had been disciplined by her middle school principal, McGonigle, for dress-code vio-
lations.83 In response, J.S. and a friend created a fake MySpace profile of McGonigle
on March 18, 2007.84 The evidence showed that the profile “was created at J.S.’s
home, on a computer belonging to J.S.’s parents.”85 The profile contained severely vul-
gar language and was filled with “personal attacks” on the principal.86 For example,
the “About me” section of the profile read as follows:
HELLO CHILDREN[.] yes. it’s your oh so wonderful, hairy,
expressionless, sex addict, fagass, put on this world with a small
dick PRINCIPAL[.] I have come to myspace so I can pervert the
minds of other principal’s [sic] to be just like me. I know, I
know, you’re all thrilled[.] Another reason I came to myspace is
because—I am keeping an eye on you students (who[m] I care
for so much)[.] For those who want to be my friend, and aren’t
in my school[,] I love children, sex (any kind), dogs, long walks
on the beach, tv, being a dick head, and last but not least my
darling wife who looks like a man (who satisfies my needs)
MY FRAINTRAIN . . . .87
Clearly, this type of speech was malicious. Because the profile was also posted on
the Internet by J.S. and her friend, this suggested that she wanted others to see it.
In the days that followed, discovery of the profile by McGonigle and the pun-
ishment of J.S. were swift:
81 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012).
82 See Joseph A. Tomain, Cyberspace Is Outside the Schoolhouse Gate: Offensive, Online
Student Speech Receives First Amendment Protection, 59 DRAKE L. REV. 97, 151 (2010)
(explaining that although the Third Circuit applied the Tinker standard and disagreed with
the trial court’s analysis under Fraser, it agreed with the trial court that no substantial disrup-
tion had occurred or was reasonably foreseeable to occur because of the student’s speech).
83 Snyder, 650 F.3d at 920.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 921.
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McGonigle learned about the profile on March 19, 2007. On
March 20, 2007, a teacher told McGonigle that students were
discussing the profile during class. Upon McGonigle’s request,
a student brought him a printed copy of the profile. McGonigle
learned J.S. and K.L. created the profile and questioned them on
March 22, 2007. J.S. initially denied creating the profile, but she
eventually admitted that she created it with K.L. McGonigle
contacted MySpace to remove the profile.88
In the end, J.S. was given a ten-day suspension from school for making false accu-
sations about her principal, but McGonigle decided not to press any charges.89
J.S., through her parents, subsequently sued the school district for violating her
free speech rights.90 The school district argued, in its defense, that although J.S. en-
gaged in off-campus speech, it could nonetheless punish her pursuant to the Tinker
standard.91 The Third Circuit agreed that in cases involving off-campus speech, Tinker
controls, when it stated: “The Court in Tinker held that ‘to justify prohibition of a par-
ticular expression of opinion,’ school officials must demonstrate that ‘the forbidden
conduct would materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of appro-
priate discipline in the operation of the school.’”92 The school district claimed that
J.S.’s speech disrupted school operations in two ways. First, there were “rumblings,”
or a general buzz among students who were discussing the profile.93 Second, because
a school guidance counselor was directed to be present during Principal McGonigle’s
meeting with J.S. and her parents, several prescheduled counseling appointments
were canceled on the morning of the meeting.94
88 Carolyn Joyce Mattus, Is It Really My Space?: Public Schools and Student Speech on
the Internet After Layshock v. Hermitage School District and Snyder v. Blue Mountain
School District, 16 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 318, 327 (2010).
89 Snyder, 650 F.3d at 922; Mattus, supra note 88, at 327.
90 Snyder, 650 F.3d at 920 (summarizing the claims as: 1) that the school district violated
J.S.’s First Amendment rights; 2) “that the School District’s policies were unconstitutionally
overbroad and vague”; 3) “that the School District violated the Snyders’ Fourteenth Amend-
ment substantive due process rights to raise their child”; and 4) “that the School District
acted outside of its authority in punishing J.S. for out-of-school speech”).
91 Id. at 922–23.
92 Id. at 926 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509
(1969)).
93 Id. at 922. Specifically, “a Middle School math teacher [ ] experienced a disruption in
his class when six or seven students were talking and discussing the profile; [the teacher] had
to tell the students to stop talking three times, and raised his voice on the third occasion.” Id.
94 Id. at 923 (“[Guidance Counselor] Frain canceled a small number of student counseling
appointments to supervise student testing on the morning that McGonigle met with J.S., K.L.,
and their parents. Counselor Guers was originally scheduled to supervise the student testing,
but was asked by McGonigle to sit in on the meetings, so Frain filled in for Guers.”).
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Despite agreeing with the school district that Tinker was the applicable standard,
the Third Circuit held that J.S.’s actions caused neither a substantial disruption nor
a foreseeable disruption to school activities.95 In support of this holding, the Third
Circuit relied on 1) the fact that “J.S. created the profile as a joke”; 2) “she took steps
to make it ‘private’ so that access was limited to her and her friends”; and 3) the pro-
file “was so juvenile and nonsensical that no reasonable person could take its content
seriously,” among other things.96
So, after rehearing the case, the Third Circuit held that off-campus student speech
is governed by Tinker, and not Fraser, as the trial court previously held.97 But even
though the facts of Snyder were analogous to those of Kowalski, the Third Circuit held
that a substantial disruption to school activities was not reasonably foreseeable.98 Both
cases involved a student creating a social media page containing vulgar language,
sharing that content with other students to some degree, and disrupting school acti-
vities. So what was the difference between this scenario and that in Kowalski that could
warrant a completely different holding? It could be that several students discussing
the defamation of their principal during school hours was not a substantial enough
disruption for the Third Circuit, or it might be that, because McGonigle was an ad-
ministrator, some of the concerns about regulating speech do not necessarily apply,
because it was not a case of pupil-on-pupil bullying. While the Third Circuit finally
did adopt Tinker as the standard for analyzing off-campus student speech,99 it took
several tries. Further, the Third Circuit’s result was not in line with the Fourth
Circuit’s Kowalski approach, which held that vulgar speech posted online and shared
with classmates creates a reasonably foreseeable risk of a substantial disruption (and
in fact did create a disruption) to school activities.100
Another recent case that, once again, involved a scenario similar to Kowalski but
reached the opposite holding is J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified School
95 Id. at 929–30.
96 Id.
97 In fact, the Third Circuit went so far as to say that the Fraser standard that the trial
court attempted to apply was actually one of the few exceptions carved out of the Tinker
standard, which only applies to on-campus speech. The panel stated:
[T]he Supreme Court has carved out a number of narrow categories of
speech that a school may restrict even without the threat of substantial
disruption. The first exception is set out in Fraser, which we inter-
preted to permit school officials to regulate “‘lewd’, ‘vulgar’, ‘indecent’,
and ‘plainly offensive’ speech in school.” The second exception to
Tinker is articulated in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, which
allows school officials to “regulate school-sponsored speech (that is,
speech that a reasonable observer would view as the school’s own
speech) on the basis of any legitimate pedagogical concern.”
Id. at 927 (citations omitted).
98 Id. at 931.
99 Id. at 927, 931–32.
100 Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 574 (4th Cir. 2011).
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District.101 This case involved a student posting a video on YouTube that depicted
a group of students making fun of a fellow classmate, C.C.102 Once again, the lan-
guage was cruel:
One of Plaintiff’s friends, R.S., calls C.C. a “slut,” says that C.C.
is “spoiled,” talks about “boners,” and uses profanity during the
recording. R.S. also says that C.C. is “the ugliest piece of shit
I’ve ever seen in my whole life.” During the video, J.C. is heard
encouraging R.S. to continue to talk about C.C., telling her to
“continue with the Carina rant.”103
Once again, the effects of the off-campus speech reached the school campus.104
Specifically, C.C. overheard other students talking about the video at school, and
she became “very upset” as a result.105 Her mother accompanied her to school the
next day and met with a school guidance counselor to discuss the YouTube video.106
During this meeting, C.C. was visibly upset about the incident, and stated that she did
not feel comfortable going to class that day.107 After spending some time counseling
C.C., the guidance counselor convinced her to return to class, but she had missed
some class time that morning as a result of her feelings being hurt by the video.108
At first glance, these facts seem strikingly similar to that of Kowalski, when the
Fourth Circuit stated:
Given the targeted, defamatory nature of Kowalski’s speech,
aimed at a fellow classmate, it created “actual or nascent” sub-
stantial disorder and disruption in the school. First, the creation
of the “S.A.S.H.” group forced Shay N. to miss school in order
to avoid further abuse. Moreover, had the school not intervened,
the potential for continuing and more serious harassment of
Shay N. as well as other students was real.109
Both of these cases involved a student posting disparaging remarks about a classmate
online and contacting other students about those remarks,110 subsequently causing
101 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
102 Beverly Hills, 711 F. Supp. 2d at 1098.
103 Id. (citations omitted).
104 Id. at 1098–99.
105 Id. at 1098.
106 Id.
107 Id. (“[C.C.] was crying and told [the guidance counselor] that she did not want to go
to class. C.C. said she faced ‘humiliation’ and had ‘hurt feelings.’” (citation omitted)).
108 Id.
109 Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 574 (4th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).
110 The Plaintiff in Beverly Hills “contacted 5 to 10 students from the School and told
them to look at the video on YouTube.” Beverly Hills, 711 F. Supp. 2d at 1098.
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harm on campus (in the form of absence and further discussion of the bullying). But
once again, like Snyder, the Beverly Hills court held that under the Tinker standard,
no substantial disruption occurred or could be reasonably foreseen.111 Specifically,
the court “found that the lack of evidence of a prior relationship between the stu-
dents involved in the video did not support a prediction that a verbal or physical con-
frontation was likely to occur, and therefore rejected the school district’s argument
that there was a reasonable fear of disruption.”112 Once again, this outcome, which
is the opposite of that in Kowalski, might be due to the court’s view of what the
threshold for “substantial disruption” really is, i.e., along with the Third Circuit, the
Central District of California has deemed things like absence from school, interven-
tion from school counselors and school administration, and the awareness of the
bullying by the student body as insubstantial.113
Another, more realistic, possibility is that both Snyder and Beverly Hills largely
ignore the prong of Tinker that allows administrators to act in light of circumstances
that are reasonably foreseeable to create a substantial disruption.114 In fact, Judge
Fisher addressed this issue at length during his dissent in Snyder.115 He disagreed with
the majority’s view that the Plaintiff’s actions did not have the potential to create a
substantial disruption on campus.116 Specifically, Judge Fisher noted that “accusing
school officials of sexual misconduct poses a foreseeable threat of diverting school
resources required to correct the misinformation and remedy confusion.”117 In other
words, he believed that given the serious nature of an accusation that a principal
engaged in inappropriate sexual behavior, it was reasonably foreseeable that a con-
cerned parent or student might mention something to the police, and an investigation
would ensue. Judge Fisher also noted the potential for disruption from the viewpoint
of the educators at the school,118 in addition to the effect it could have on the student
body. He stated:
111 Id. at 1117.
112 Samantha M. Levin, Note, School Districts as Weathermen: The School’s Ability to
Reasonably Forecast Substantial Disruption to the School Environment from Students’
Online Speech, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 859, 889 (2011).
113 See J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094,
1117–19 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
114 See, e.g., id. at 1119–22.
115 J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 941 (3d Cir. 2011)
(Fisher, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012).
116 Id. at 945 (“But the profile’s potential to cause disruption was reasonably foreseeable,
and that is sufficient.”).
117 Id.
118 Judge Fisher did this by analogizing the factual scenario in Snyder to a recent Second
Circuit case, Wisniewski v. Board of Education, in which the Second Circuit noted “that a
teacher who was subjected to hostile student speech became distressed and had to stop
teaching the student’s class.” Id. at 947 (citing Wisniewski v. Board of Educ., 494 F.3d 34,
35–36 (2d Cir. 2007)).
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The majority also overlooks the substantial disruptions to the
classroom environment that follow from personal and harmful
attacks on educators and school officials. J.S.’s speech attacked
McGonigle and Frain in personal and vulgar terms and broad-
casted it to the school community. This kind of harassment has
tangible effects on educators. It may cause teachers to leave the
school and stop teaching altogether, and those who decide to stay
are oftentimes less effective.119
More importantly, Judge Fisher realized that even after finally adopting the
Tinker standard as applied to off-campus speech, the Third Circuit’s reading of the
case created a circuit split with the Second Circuit.120 This is of particular importance,
given the Kowalski court’s heavy reliance on Second Circuit jurisprudence in formu-
lating its interpretation and application of Tinker.121 Specifically, Judge Fisher calls
attention to the Second Circuit’s Doninger v. Niehoff 122 opinion, which dealt with an
almost identical set of facts as both Snyder and Kowalski, and held that the school ad-
ministration could punish online speech directed towards school officials because this
type of speech creates a risk of a substantial disruption to the school environment.123
The facts in Doninger are summarized as follows: The plaintiff was a member
of her high school’s student council, and mistakenly believed that the administration
had canceled a student event that the council had planned.124 In response, the plain-
tiff made a blog post directed toward the administration from her home computer,
in which she stated that the event was “cancelled due to douchebags in the central
office.”125 Like Snyder and Kowalski, the plaintiff in Doninger shared her offensive
speech with other students, encouraging others to call or write the school administrator
responsible for the decision “to piss [the administrator] off more.”126 As a result of the
119 Id. at 946 (citing Jina S. Yoon, Teacher Characteristics as Predictors of Teacher-Student
Relationships: Stress, Negative Affect, and Self-Efficacy, 30 SOC. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY
485, 491 (2002); Suzanne Tochterman & Fred Barnes, Sexual Harassment in the Classroom:
Teachers as Targets, 7 RECLAIMING CHILD. & YOUTH 21, 22 (1998)).
120 Id. at 950 (“Our decision today causes a split with the Second Circuit. In applying Tinker,
the Second Circuit has held that off-campus hostile and offensive student internet speech that is
directed at school officials results in a substantial disruption of the classroom environment.”).
121 See Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 574 (4th Cir. 2011) (explaining that
it adopts the Second Circuit’s holding in Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008),
which allows schools to regulate off-campus speech so long as there is a reasonable foresee-
ability that the speech will make its way on campus, thereby causing a disturbance).
122 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008).
123 Snyder, 650 F.3d at 951 (Fisher, J., dissenting) (explaining that the Doninger Plaintiff’s
blog post “foreseeably create[d] a risk of substantial disruption within the school environment”).
124 In reality, the school administration had only proposed an alternate venue for the event
due to some scheduling conflicts. See Doninger, 527 F.3d at 44.
125 Id. at 45.
126 Id.
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blog post, the school refused to allow the student to run for Junior Class Secretary.127
The plaintiff attempted to challenge the administration’s punishment as an infringe-
ment of her free speech rights, but the Second Circuit, using the Tinker standard for
off-campus speech, held that the administration was justified in its punishment.128 Spe-
cifically, the Second Circuit ruled that even if there had been no disruption of school
activities as a result of the blog post, the administration could still punish the plaintiff
under Tinker because it was reasonably foreseeable that “administrators and teachers
would be further diverted from their core educational responsibilities by the need to
dissipate misguided anger or confusion over [the event’s] purported cancellation.”129
Judge Fisher realized that although adopting the Second and Fourth Circuit’s use
of the Tinker standard for off-campus speech (instead of using the Fraser “vulgar
and offensive” standard) on rehearing, the Third Circuit had nonetheless created a cir-
cuit split through its application of the standard, particularly in the area of “reasonable
foreseeability.”130 He bluntly stated that the difference in outcome between Snyder
and cases like Doninger (and necessarily Kowalski and Wisniewski, among others)
was a result of how the circuits differed in analyzing the potential for this type of
speech to cause a disruption of school activities: “The Second Circuit held that hostile
and offensive off-campus student speech posed a reasonably foreseeable threat of sub-
stantial disruption within the school.”131 Instead, Judge Fisher believed that the Third
Circuit should have joined others, such as the Second and Fourth Circuits, in holding
that offensive online speech directed towards the school (students or officials) should
be deemed to per se have the potential to create a reasonably foreseeable disruption
to school activities.132
Despite adopting the Tinker standard, decisions like Snyder and Beverly Hills
leave much to be desired. Not only do they analyze the basic Tinker definition of
127 Id. at 46 (“Avery was not allowed to have her name on the ballot or to give a campaign
speech at a May 25 school assembly regarding the elections. Apart from this disqualification
from running for Senior Class Secretary, she was not otherwise disciplined.”).
128 Id. at 50 (explaining that the speech in the blog post, “although created off-campus,
‘was purposely designed . . . to come onto the campus’”).
129 Id. at 51–52.
130 J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 941, 950 (3d Cir. 2011)
(Fisher, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012).
131 Id. at 950.
132 Judge Fisher stated:
The majority embraces a notion that student hostile and offensive on-
line speech directed at school officials will not reach the school. But
with near-constant student access to social networking sites on and off
campus, when offensive and malicious speech is directed at school
officials and disseminated online to the student body, it is reasonable
to anticipate an impact on the classroom environment. I fear that our
Court has adopted a rule that will prove untenable.
Id. at 951–52.
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“reasonable foreseeability” differently than Second and Fourth Circuit jurispru-
dence,133 but they also provide little guidance for other courts in determining the
extent of school authority to punish students for off-campus cyberspeech. In addi-
tion, rulings such as Snyder limit a school system’s ability to be proactive, because
the Third Circuit read the “reasonably foreseeable” component of Tinker in a limited
fashion. If the Third Circuit’s view of what Tinker really stands for is adopted nation-
wide, then we are left with a situation in which school administrators are aware of
vulgar or offensive speech that is directed toward school officials or students, but
are unable to act because the speech occurred off campus.134 Courts have been in-
creasingly willing to hold school districts liable in circumstances involving knowl-
edge of such targeted speech and school inaction,135 meaning that unless courts adopt
the reading of Tinker that was promulgated in Kowalski, there will be a gap between
speech schools can regulate, and speech for which they can be held liable.
C. Fears that Kowalski Will Limit Freedom of Expression
Some scholars fear that “affording teachers wide latitude in censoring cyberbullies
would have a chilling effect on speech because it gives rise to self-censorships.”136 In
the alternative, since the substantial disruption test allows educators to be proactive,137
some may fear that educators will overstep their authority and regulate speech to the
detriment of students’ First Amendment rights. This fear, however, “is the type of
‘undifferentiated fear’ that the Supreme Court has held should not govern the out-
come of cases involving student speech.”138
Why is this fear undifferentiated? School administrators can be held liable for
constitutional violations in the event that they try to regulate too broadly.139 So, the
133 See id. at 951. The court explained that, despite the Plaintiff’s intentions of the speech
never reaching the middle school, because her speech was directed toward school officials
and disseminated to the student body, it was “reasonably foreseeable that her speech would
cause a substantial disruption of the educational process and the classroom environment. And
it is on this point that the majority parts ways with the Second Circuit.” Id.
134 See id. at 952 (“I believe the majority has unwisely tipped the balance struck by Tinker,
Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and Morse, thereby jeopardizing schools’ ability to maintain an orderly
learning environment.”).
135 See infra Part IV.B.
136 Shannon L. Doering, Tinkering with School Discipline in the Name of the First Amend-
ment: Expelling a Teacher’s Ability to Proactively Quell Disruptions Caused by Cyberbullies
at the Schoolhouse, 87 NEB. L. REV. 630, 658 (2009).
137 Id. at 657.
138 Id. (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969)).
139 See, e.g., Byars v. City of Waterbury, 795 A.2d 630, 639 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2001)
(holding that a defendant can be held liable if a plaintiff can prove that the “defendant sub-
jected him or her to a policy or conduct that violate[s] a right protected by federal law”).
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potential for liability will dissuade administrators from exercising their power too
broadly,140 and they will act only in the most appropriate situations.
IV. THE RATIONALE FOR REGULATING STUDENT SPEECH
A. Promoting the Goals of Public Education
Regulating off-campus student speech is important to school administrators for
several reasons. One reason is that stopping students from bullying or harassing each
other helps to promote the goals of public education.141 For example, the Sixth Circuit
has held that as a baseline, a goal of school administration is to “not only ameliorate
the harmful effects of disruptions, but to prevent them from happening in the first
place.”142 In fact, the federal government has dedicated resources to the prevention
of bullying, as it causes significant on-campus disruption.143 The Fourth Circuit even
weighed in on this in Kowalski, stating that “school administrators must be able to
prevent and punish harassment and bullying in order to provide a safe school envi-
ronment conducive to learning.”144
As the youngest demographic of our society, students not only learn academi-
cally in the public school system, but also begin to develop their social skills.145 “As
they learn how to express themselves, however, students predictably push the bound-
aries of acceptable speech to its outer limits, which can have a profound effect on
the school environment.”146 All forms of bullying, including cyberbullying, limit the
effectiveness of public educators.147
As noted above, the Supreme Court has acknowledged the school system’s im-
portance in the social and academic development of our youngest citizens. In fact,
140 See, e.g., Doering, supra note 136, at 657 (arguing that “educators should be trusted
to refrain from imposing discipline upon the cyberbully unless the circumstances within the
school require it”).
141 Renee L. Servance, Cyberbullying, Cyber-Harassment, and the Conflict Between Schools
and the First Amendment, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 1213, 1228.
142 Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584, 596 (6th Cir. 2007).
143 See, e.g., STOPBULLYING.GOV, http://www.stopbullying.gov (last visited Oct. 14, 2012)
(explaining that bullying causes disruptions within the student population such as depression
and self-harm).
144 Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 572 (4th Cir. 2011).
145 Servance, supra note 149, at 1238 (citing Philip T.K. Daniel & Patrick Pauken, The
Electronic Media and School Violence: Lessons Learned and Issues Presented, 164 EDUC.
L. REP. 1, 5 (2002)).
146 Id.
147 Myers & Carper, supra note 4, at 4–5 (“The victims [of bullying] may become truants,
experience a loss of interest in learning which in turn causes a drop in academic grades, or
become at risk of dropping out, transferring, or switching schools.” (citations omitted)).
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in Brown v. Board of Education,148 the Court stated that the public school system “is
a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values . . . and in helping
him to adjust normally to his environment.”149 The Court obviously holds public
education in high regard, and entrusts the institution with the development of our
children. It follows, then, that “school officials are also the appropriate actors to both
punish and prevent cyberbullying.”150
B. Avoiding Potential Liability
Another reason for school administrators to have an interest in regulating off-
campus speech is the desire to avoid potential liability for the consequences of it,
which are becoming more extreme with the emergence of social media and cyber-
bullying.151 On the liability front, schools seem to exist somewhere between a rock
and a hard place. Many jurisdictions have limited school authority to regulate only
on-campus speech, despite the precedent set by Tinker. The other jurisdictions that fol-
low Tinker interpret its “substantial disruption” test inconsistently, as noted above.152
This means that schools that attempt to overreach by regulating off-campus speech
(despite legitimate concerns) have been held financially liable for violating the First
Amendment rights of students.153 On the other hand, school systems also face liabil-
ity for “inaction in the case of peer-to-peer harassment.”154 Without a uniform rule
authorizing schools to act to regulate off-campus speech in certain situations, schools
will continue to struggle with the question of when to regulate speech, and when to
refrain from acting due to First Amendment constraints.155
148 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
149 Id. at 493.
150 Darcy K. Lane, Note, Taking the Lead on Cyberbullying: Why Schools Can and Should
Protect Students Online, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1791, 1804 (2011).
151 See Marie Hartwell-Walker, Cyberbullying and Teen Suicide, PSYCH CENTRAL, http://
psychcentral.com/lib/2010/cyberbullying-and-teen-suicide/all/1/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2012)
(“Tragically, [cyberbullying] is leading to increasing numbers of suicides among our teens.”).
152 See notes 10–11 and accompanying text.
153 See Servance, supra note 141, at 1214 (citing Mark Rollenhagen, Westlake Schools to
Pay $30,000 to Settle Net Suit, PLAIN DEALER, Apr. 14, 1998, at 1A) (explaining that school
systems have had to settle cases alleging infringement of First Amendment rights resulting
from punishment of students for off-campus speech, with settlement values reaching as much
as $30,000).
154 Id. at 1215 (citing Susan H. Kosse, Student Designed Home Web Pages: Does Title IX
or the First Amendment Apply?, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 905, 919–20 (2001)).
155 See Melissa L. Gilbert, Note, “Time-Out” for Student Threats?: Imposing a Duty to
Protect on School Officials, 49 UCLA L. REV. 917, 939 (2002) (“Sometimes school officials
overreact, thereby alienating students, or exposing themselves to liability because of their
affirmative actions. Other times, school officials turn a blind eye to a potential risk to students.”
(citations omitted)).
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Parents of students who have been harmed, or, in the most extreme cases, driven
to suicide, by off-campus speech in violation of school policies have been increasingly
willing to file actions against school administrations.156 The most common claims
include state law tort claims, Section 1983 claims,157 and Title IX claims.158
1. Tort Claims
A victim’s main impediment to recovery under state tort theories (mainly
negligence-based theories) is the qualified immunity of school officials and the
school system, as they are viewed as government instruments or entities.159 Qualified
immunity, however, might not continue to stifle victims’ efforts to obtain recovery
as it has in the past. In a recent Ohio case, for example, the court dismissed the charges
against a school police officer under qualified immunity but allowed the charges
against the school district to proceed.160 The case arose from a tragic incident in
which a middle school student took her own life after facing ridicule for sending a
nude photo of herself over her cellular phone.161 Her parents filed suit against the
school board, seeking damages based on “[several] negligence-based theories.”162
In addition, schools may be held liable for failure to protect students from tor-
tious acts committed by other students, based on a theory in the Second Restatement
of Torts.163 For example, in Furek v. University of Delaware,164 the Supreme Court
156 See Conn, supra note 3, at 227 (citing Christian Nolan, Fighting Bullying with Lawsuits,
CONN. L. TRIB. (Oct. 29, 2010), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202474106893&
Fighting_Bullying_With_Lawsuits).
157 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute provides that:
[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law . . . .
Id.
158 See generally Conn, supra note 3, at 232–33 (explaining that parents of bullied chil-
dren have sued school districts under Title IX).
159 Id. (citing Killen v. Independent Sch. Dist., No. 706, 547 N.W. 2d 113, 116 (Minn.
App. 1996)) (explaining that qualified immunity extends to governmental officials for dis-
cretionary acts).
160 Logan v. Sycamore Cmty. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 780 F. Supp. 2d 594, 599 (S.D. Ohio 2011).
161 Id. at 595.
162 Gregory Keating, Navigating Legal Issues Related to Cyberbullying: An Immediate Look
at the Legal and Social Impact of Digital Harassment, 2011 ASPATORE SPECIAL REP. 6 (2011).
163 See, e.g., Furek v. Univ. of Del., 594 A.2d 506, 520 (Del. 1991) (predicating an edu-
cational institution’s liability on the Second Restatement of Torts).
164 594 A.2d 506 (Del. 1991).
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of Delaware held that an educational institution could be held liable for injury
caused to a student as a result of fraternity hazing.165 The court found liability based
on the Second Restatement of Torts, “which addresses the duty of one who assumes
direct responsibility for the safety of another by performing services in the area of
protection.”166 The court believed that the University had assumed responsibility be-
cause of its acknowledgment of fraternity hazing problems and its policies directed
to prevent hazing.167 In addition to the legal theory relied upon in Furek, Section 320
of the First Restatement of Torts provides another similar theory of recovery. It states
that “[o]ne who is required . . . to take . . . the custody of another . . . subject[ing]
him to association with persons likely to harm him, is under a duty to exercise rea-
sonable care . . . to control the conduct of third persons as to prevent them from in-
tentionally harming the other . . . .”168 Along these lines, since many public school
systems have enacted anti-bullying legislation (including cyberbullying),169 some
scholars have posited that similar liability may be imposed on public schools, follow-
ing the theory of the Furek decision.170
Indeed, this hypothesis seems to be coming to fruition, in light of the holding
in Scruggs v. Meriden Board of Education,171 a Connecticut decision involving a
student who committed suicide after years of being bullied at school. The court held
that the school administration had knowledge of the bullying incidents, since the
child’s mother complained numerous times to the administration in an effort to help
curb other students’ actions against her son.172 The court relied on a similar theory that
can be seen as an extension of the Furek decision, by holding that several “exceptions”
165 Id. at 520.
166 Duffy B. Trager, New Tricks for Old Dogs: The Tinker Standard Applied to Cyber-
Bullying, 38 J.L. & EDUC. 553, 560 (2009).
167 Furek, 594 A.2d at 520 (“The evidence in this record, however, strongly suggests that
the University not only was knowledgeable of the dangers of hazing but, in repeated com-
munications to students in general and fraternities in particular, emphasized the University
policy of discipline for hazing infractions. The University’s policy against hazing, like its
overall commitment to provide security on its campus, thus constituted an assumed duty
which became ‘an indispensable part of the bundle of services which colleges . . . afford their
students.’” (quoting Mullins v. Pine Manor Coll., 449 N.E. 2d 331, 336 (Mass. 1983))).
168 Trager, supra note 166, at 560 (quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 320 (1934)).
169 See Myers & Carper, supra note 4, at 5–6 (explaining that cyberbullying is on the leg-
islative agendas of many states, and that many states, such as Delaware, South Carolina, and
Minnesota have established “legislation that requires school districts to establish a policy on
bullying prevention and reporting”).
170 See Trager, supra note 166, at 560 (“Many states have implemented legislation re-
quiring schools to have policies against bullying. Similar liability to that imposed against the
University of Delaware could be found when administrators are aware of cyber-bullying and
there is an anti-bullying policy in place.”).
171 No. 3:03-CV-2224(PCD), 2007 WL 2318851 (D. Conn. Aug. 10, 2007).
172 Id. at *3.
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exist to the rule that qualified immunity generally bars lawsuits for monetary dam-
ages against school employees.173 The court stated these exceptions explicitly:
[F]irst, where the circumstances make it apparent to the public
officer that his or her failure to act would be likely to subject an
identifiable person to imminent harm . . . [,] second, where a stat-
ute specifically provides for a cause of action against a municipal-
ity or municipal official for failure to enforce certain laws . . . [,]
and third, where the alleged acts involve malice, wantonness, or
intent to injure, rather than negligence.174
While previously a bar to recovery, trends in case law seem to point to an in-
creasing willingness by courts to hold schools liable when certain conditions like
those above are met. The result, therefore, is an increasing chance that schools will
be held liable should a uniform rule regarding a school’s authority to regulate off-
campus speech not emerge, especially when instances of cyberbullying are brought
to the administration’s attention.
2. Section 1983 Claims
Section 1983 is another common method of recovery for victims of bullying.175
There are several advantages to bringing a federal suit under Section 1983; for ex-
ample, “[s]ome states statutorily cap damage awards, while others have laws immuniz-
ing the government from certain tort actions altogether.”176 According to Section 1983:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regula-
tion, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.177
To establish a prima facie case, a plaintiff suing under Section 1983 “must demon-
strate both that she was deprived of an existing federal right and that the deprivation
occurred under color of state law.”178
173 Id. at *21.
174 Id. (quoting Burns v. Board of Educ., 228 Conn. 640, 645 (1994)).
175 See Deborah Austern Colson, Note, Safe Enough to Learn: Placing an Affirmative
Duty of Protection on Public Schools Under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 169, 170 (1995).
176 Id. at 171 (citing Michael Gilbert, Keeping the Door Open: A Middle Ground on the
Question of Affirmative Duty in the Public Schools, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 471, 471 n.3 (1993)).
177 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
178 See Colson, supra note 175, at 172.
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There are many theories of recovery under Section 1983,179 but this Note fo-
cuses on the “special relationship” test, since student victims have found increased
success (albeit limited) under this theory of recovery in the Fifth Circuit.180 In Doe
v. Taylor Independent School District,181 the court held that school officials could
be liable for failing to prevent a female student from being molested by her teacher
on several occasions.182 Although a different test was applied by the Fifth Circuit in
Doe, “the court implied that it also would have held the school liable if the case had
been litigated under a ‘special relationship’ theory.”183 The court noted in dicta that
since a child generally depends on his parents to guard him against surrounding dan-
gers, when the State removes the child from his home it assumes the responsibility
of protecting the child.184 The court stated:
Parents, guardians, and the children themselves have little choice
but to rely on the school officials for some measure of protection
and security while in school . . . . To hold otherwise would call
into question the constitutionality of compulsory attendance stat-
utes, for we would be permitting a state to compel parents to sur-
render their offspring to the tender mercies of school officials
without exacting some assurance from the state that school offi-
cials will undertake the role of guardian . . . .185
The Fifth Circuit has, however, expressed limitations on the breadth of the spe-
cial relationship between the school and student for purposes of liability.186 In Leffall
v. Dallas Independent School District,187 the Fifth Circuit reinforced its view that a
public school owes a duty of protection to students, but also commented that “no
such . . . relationship exists during [school-sponsored events] held outside of the
time during which students are required to attend school . . . . [A]ny special relation-
ship that may have existed lapse[s] when compulsory attendance end[s].”188
Students have had success with this theory in other localities as well. For example,
in Pagano v. Massapequa Public Schools,189 the Federal District Court for the Eastern
179 Id. at 175–83 (describing the most common methods of recovery under Section 1983
as: the “custom, policy, or practice” theory, the “state-created danger” theory, and the “special
relationship” test).
180 Id. at 181 (citing Walton v. Alexander, 20 F.3d 1350 (5th Cir. 1994)).
181 975 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1992), vacated, 15 F.3d 443 (5th Cir. 1994).
182 Id. at 147–48.
183 See Colson, supra note 175, at 182.
184 Id.
185 Doe, 975 F.2d at 147.
186 See Colson, supra note 175, at 182–83.
187 28 F.3d 521 (5th Cir. 1994).
188 Colson, supra note 175, at 183 (quoting Leffall, 28 F.3d at 522).
189 714 F. Supp. 641 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
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District of New York held that a student’s “seventeen reported incidents [of bullying]
and the school’s failure to take preventative action were more than a single act of neg-
ligence and may ‘rise to the level of deliberate indifference to an affirmative duty.’”190
According to the Eastern District of New York, Section 1983 requires a school
not to sit idly by and tolerate occurrences of bullying that occur during school hours.191
Per Leffall, a school does not have any special relationship to a student outside of reg-
ular school hours.192 This presents an interesting problem in the case of cyberbullying,
where the initial actions often occur off campus and after school hours have ended.
The effects of cyberbullying, however, are often felt inside the school, and include
ridicule, embarrassment, truancy, and further responses by the victim’s antagonists.193
Does the fact that the effects are felt inside the school require the administration to
take “preventative action” and regulate instances of cyberbullying that occur off cam-
pus? Under the current Section 1983 framework, the answer is unclear. And when
the answer is unclear, schools face a catch-22: either regulate off-campus speech and
risk a First Amendment suit, or do nothing and risk a suit by the target of the off-
campus speech.
3. Title IX Liability
Title IX actions for damages against federally funded institutions that act with
“deliberate indifference” apply to acts of harassment when the harassment “is so
severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it effectively bars the victim’s ac-
cess to an educational opportunity or benefit.”194 Courts typically find liability under
Title IX when a school’s response “is clearly unreasonable in light of the known cir-
cumstances.”195 Specifically, courts have held that schools display deliberate indif-
ference “when a school has knowledge of multiple incidents of harassment and fails
to take preventative measures.”196 For example, in Davis v. Monroe County Board
of Education,197 the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff could establish liability on
remand by showing the defendant school’s actions rose to the level of deliberate
190 Elizabeth M. Jaffe & Robert J. D’Agostino, Bullying in Public Schools: The Inter-
section Between the Student’s Free Speech Rights and the School’s Duty to Protect, 62
MERCER L. REV. 407, 435 (2011) (quoting Pagano, 714 F. Supp. at 643).
191 See id. at 434–35.
192 See supra notes 187–96 and accompanying text.
193 See Melanie Black Dubis, Navigating Legal Issues Related to Cyberbullying: An
Immediate Look at the Legal and Social Impact of Digital Harassment, 2011 ASPATORE
SPECIAL REP. 6 (describing these effects and noting that the effects are felt inside of school
even when the cyberbullying occurs outside of school).
194 Jaffe & D’Agostino, supra note 190, at 437 (quoting Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of
Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999)).
195 Id. (quoting Davis, 526 U.S. at 648).
196 Id.
197 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
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indifference after it failed to act in the wake of multiple reports of sexual harassment
against the victim.198
4. Cost of Potential Liability
As noted above, instances of cyberbullying in the United States have risen in
recent years due to increasingly accessible technology.199 One would also assume
that lawsuits awarding damages to the victims of cyberbullying would also increase
during this time, especially given some of the high-profile, media-friendly cases that
have netted victims and their families substantial sums of money.200 This, however,
is not the case. “High-profile news accounts notwithstanding, it is extremely diffi-
cult to document whether and how much bullying-related litigation may have actu-
ally increased in recent years.”201 This does not mean, however, that these types of
cases are not being brought. Scholars have posited that specifics on school liability
in these type of cases are hard to come by, because most lawsuits that involve bul-
lying are likely to be settled out of court, and many of those that do go to trial are
not likely appealed, meaning that instances of school liability do not show up in the
primary legal databases.202
Specific statistics regarding the amount of school liability aside, it is apparent
that parents of victims of cyberbullying have several avenues of recovery, and have
increasingly used these avenues by filing lawsuits.203 Even though many of these cases
settle, and do not further add to American jurisprudence related to cyberbullying, the
cost, even of settlement, can be quite high. For example, one account of the settlement
landscape describes amounts of as much as $30,000.204 Given the fact that public
school systems across the nation have had to slash budgets as a result of the recent
economic crisis,205 any amount that schools might have to pay is detrimental to the
smooth workings of the educational system. Even if courts will not continue to find
increasing liability, the widespread adoption of technology and the number of
198 Id. at 653–54.
199 See King, supra note 28, at 849 (reporting a fifty percent increase in online harassment
reported by youth in the United States from years 2000 and 2005).
200 See ROBIN M. KOWALSKI, SUSAN P. LIMBER & PATRICIA W. AGATSTON, CYBER
BULLYING 164 (2008) (explaining that several recent, high-profile cases involving school
bullying have held schools liable for amounts ranging from $50,000 to $4.5 million).
201 Id.
202 Id. at 164–65.
203 See supra notes 164–66 and accompanying text.
204 See, e.g., supra note 161 and accompanying text.
205 See Kimberly Hefling, School Budget Cuts: Educators Fear Deepest Cuts Are Ahead,
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 24, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/10/24/schools-fear
-worst-budget-cuts_n_1028054.html (explaining that school districts across the nation have
slashed budgets for public education, and it likely will not be until 2013 or later when dis-
tricts see budget levels return to prerecession levels).
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parents willing to at least file complaints against school systems are, therefore, direct
threats to the system, given that even cases that settle cost the parties money.
V. THE “SUBSTANTIAL DISRUPTION” TEST PROMULGATED IN KOWALSKI
BEST ALLOWS A SCHOOL TO PROMOTE THE GOALS OF PUBLIC
EDUCATION AND AVOID LIABILITY IN CASES OF CYBERBULLYING
A. Promoting the Goals of Public Education
As noted above, public schools are entrusted to protect students while encourag-
ing their social and academic development.206 The obligations of the public schools
“include protecting the rights of the other students, preserving the educational envi-
ronment at the schoolhouse, and in some instances, protecting the school and even
the educators themselves from facing individual liability as a result of not addressing
the harassment . . . by the cyberbully in a timely fashion.”207 As noted above, teachers
and administrators who have failed to protect the rights of students can face liability
for their inaction.208 Decisions such as Scruggs, which hold schools liable for inac-
tion even in the event that bullying or cyberbullying has occurred off campus, create
a need for administrators to have the authority to act quickly and effectively to alle-
viate the harms of cyberbullying once they are aware of it.
School officials have a duty to prevent the occurrence of disturbances even though
“[f]orecasting disruption[s] is unmistakably difficult to do.”209 Given the increasing
instances of cyberbullying and the increasing severity of the harm caused by cyber-
bullying, such as “bullycide,”210 it follows that school officials should be given the
latitude to respond to threats or disturbances before they fully manifest on campus.
Due to the public school system’s unique position in society, it is best equipped to
regulate and punish students for cyberbullying. “Schools can . . . act relatively
quickly, punishing or deterring bullies while the parties involved are still in school
together,”211 rather than waiting on legal action that might provide relief only after a
student has graduated, dropped out, or in the most extreme cases, committed suicide.
Kowalski’s interpretation of the substantial disruption test solves the problem
that educators currently face in preventing the harms of cyberbullying so as to mini-
mize the disruption it has on school activities and the educational goals of the school
system as a whole. It allows school officials to be proactive, as they can punish a
206 See supra Part IV.A.
207 Doering, supra note 136, at 656.
208 See, e.g., supra note 153 and accompanying text.
209 Doering, supra note 136, at 656 (quoting LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981,
989 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 959 (2002)).
210 The term “bullycide” refers to when victims take their own life as a result of “a per-
vasive stream of cyberbullying.” See Keating, supra note 162.
211 Lane, supra note 150, at 1804.
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cyberbully when officials could “reasonably have [been] led . . . to forecast substan-
tial disruption of or material interference with school activities.”212 Under this test,
school officials that have knowledge of cyberbullying do not have to sit idly by and
wait until some kind of tangible harm occurs within the walls of the school. On the
contrary, school officials can, and should, act to quell the disruption caused by cyber-
bullying before it affects the student body in full force.213 The substantial disruption
test, therefore, “foresaw the possibility that educators may need to be proactive in
imposing discipline, recognizing, at least implicitly, that there may be cases where
it would be improvident to await actual harm before disciplining a student.”214 For
the approximately 160,000 students in this country that miss school each day for the
fear of being bullied,215 cyberbullying presents exactly the case in which school offi-
cials need to act, whether the bully’s words are spoken on campus or not.
B. Limiting Liability by Eliminating the Gap Between Authority to Regulate
Speech and the Speech that Can Ultimately Result in School Liability
Traditionally, schools and school administrators were held liable for inaction or
failure to prevent harm only when the specific acts that caused the harm occurred
on campus.216 The rise of technology, including the Internet, however, allows cyber-
bullies to engage in off-campus actions that create both a substantial disruption of
school activities and tangible harm suffered by the targeted victim on campus.217
Increasingly, courts are willing to hold school administrators and school systems lia-
ble for failing to address patterns of off-campus cyberbullying that result in harm to
another student or in a substantial disruption of school operations.218 Using the tra-
ditional methods of distinguishing between on-campus and off-campus speech and
determining a school’s authority based off of that, therefore, creates a gap between
a school’s authority to act and when it can be held liable for failure to act.
With this liability gap in mind, Tinker’s substantial disruption test, as adopted by
the Fourth Circuit in Kowalski, clearly provides schools with a better method of not
only preventing harm on campus, but also controlling financial liability. The Third
Circuit’s heavy adoption of the “vulgar and offensive” exception to student speech
limits an administration’s authority to act because it only addresses on-campus
212 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969).
213 See Doering, supra note 136, at 654 (“Much to the contrary, educators are expected
to protect and to foster the educational environment, as ‘[e]vents calling for discipline are
frequent occurrences and sometimes require immediate, effective action.’” (quoting New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339 (1985))).
214 Id. at 655.
215 Myers & Carper, supra note 4, at 2.
216 See supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text.
217 Myers & Carper, supra note 4, at 1.
218 See, e.g., Logan v. Sycamore Cmty. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 780 F. Supp. 2d 594 (S.D. Ohio
2011) (refusing to grant a defendant school board qualified immunity).
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speech, or speech at official school functions.219 This test assumes that there can be
no substantial disruption to school activities and the student body if speech origi-
nates anywhere but within the school walls.220 With the emergence of social media,
however, this approach is insufficient; words that are born off campus are preserved
on the Internet for others to see, which can later cause a disruption in school and harm
to the targeted victim of the speech. Courts that follow the “vulgar and offensive”
exception, then, “have taken away the schools’ ability to respond when there is a fore-
seeable disruption posed by student speech, frustrating the school’s goal[s]”221 of
maintaining a positive learning environment and protecting the school and its edu-
cators from liability. Even if courts follow the Third Circuit’s recent application of
the “substantial disruption” test that it adopted on rehearing in Snyder, its limited
definition of what “reasonably foreseeable” means still hampers educators’ ability
to be proactive and regulate off-campus speech to the point that ensures they will not
incur any liability. By setting a high threshold for what can be a foreseeable disrup-
tion to the school, the Third Circuit severely limits the scenarios in which school
administrators can intervene, even if they are aware of certain instances of targeted
and malicious online speech.222
Kowalski’s reading of the “substantial disruption” test, on the other hand, rec-
ognizes that a disruption may occur as a result of off-campus speech, taking into
account “the impact of speech on the targeted individual” and the “geographic bor-
derlessness of the Internet.”223 Internet speech is not like normal speech, in that its
effects can be felt and its targets can be harmed at a much later time.224 As a result,
a “geographical distinction is no longer a logical border to school jurisdiction over
219 See J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011)
(explaining that the school system had no authority to punish a student for internet speech
that originated from his home because “Fraser does not apply to off-campus speech” and
there was no substantial disruption under the Tinker standard, although the case dealt with
facts analogous to Kowalski), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012).
220 Id. at 932 (noting that the First Amendment protects speech uttered outside of school).
221 Servance, supra note 141, at 1232. The author also proposes that courts that follow this
standard “cause[ ] schools to hesitate to act when there is a possibility of violence out of fear
of liability under the First Amendment,” which is hardly a positive outcome. Id.
222 See Snyder, 650 F.3d at 951–52 (Fisher, J., dissenting) (“The majority embraces a no-
tion that student hostile and offensive online speech directed at school officials will not reach
the school. But with near-constant student access to social networking sites on and off campus,
when offensive and malicious speech is directed at school officials and disseminated online
to the student body, it is reasonable to anticipate an impact on the classroom environment.”).
223 Servance, supra note 141, at 1222.
224 Id. at 1235 (“Unlike traditional forms of speech, Internet content is not limited by
geography. . . . Not only is Internet speech ever-present but one can also quickly and easily
disseminate its content to an infinite number of people. This situation stands in stark contrast
to . . . traditional forms of expression that reach a far more limited audience and exist in a
particular time and place.”).
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student speech.”225 Courts have recognized this regarding school liability, but there
is an apparent lag in this realization in terms of granting school administrators the
authority to regulate the off-campus speech for which they are increasingly being
held liable.
CONCLUSION
As argued above, the “substantial disruption” test, as applied in Kowalski (and
related cases) makes the most sense for courts and schools alike to apply in instances
regarding the regulation of off-campus cyberspeech by students. The test achieves
the policy goal of preventing bullying by allowing schools to regulate speech out-
side of the school that will eventually cause harm inside the school. Kowalski’s test
is more flexible than the other standards, and it is a stronger interpretation of Tinker
than the Third Circuit’s interpretation. This yields two distinct advantages: first, it
allows school systems to more sufficiently regulate off-campus speech without fear
of liability, because Kowalski’s view of the “substantial disruption” test holds that
hostile and offensive off-campus student speech per se poses a reasonably foresee-
able threat of substantial disruption within the school.226 More importantly, the
substantial disruption test in Kowalski limits liability that schools may face in the
wake of cyberbullying incidents, because it allows administrators to be proactive
instead of reactive, and regulate speech up to the point where courts have allowed
liability in these types of cases.
Given the current judicial climate, which is split in terms of what standard to
apply and, in the event of agreement on the standard, how to interpret the standard,
Supreme Court intervention might be possible in the near future. Given the need for
schools to be proactive and limit financial liability, should the Court have the
opportunity, it should adopt Kowalski’s interpretation “substantial disruption.”
225 Id. at 1236.
226 See Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 574 (4th Cir. 2011).
